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Supply and demand in the ETS 2

The study looks at the functioning of the new emission trading system for road transport, buildings, and small installations (ETS 2) in the EU. It explains the rules governing the supply of allowances including the functioning of the market stability reserve (MSR) and the price containment mechanisms. Furthermore, it assesses the balance of supply and demand as well as auctioning revenues under different assumptions for the development of CO 2 emissions and CO 2 price. Finally, the interaction between the ETS 2 and national targets under the Effort Sharing Regulation (ESR) and the relationship with the German national ETS is assessed and an outlook for the period until 2040 is provided. Veröffentlicht in Climate Change | 09/2024.

Implementation and enforcement of EU regulations on fluorinated greenhouse gases (F-gases) und ozone-depleting substances (ODS) in Bulgaria

This report summarises the findings and results of the project “Implementation and enforcement of EU regulations on fluorinated greenhouse gases (F-gases) and ozone-depleting substances (ODS) in Bulgaria”. The project’s objective was to identify potential for improving the implementation and enforcement of different EU-regulations, e.g. of Regulation (EU) No. 517/2014, in Bulgaria. It focussed on the topics reporting, containment of ODS and F-gases, incentives for ODS destruction, supervision of the market (including internet trade), alternative technologies to F-gases, as well as training and certification contents and procedures addressing alternatives to F-gases. In addition to this final report, three guidance documents have been developed with more detailed information on the supervision of the market, on natural refrigerants, and on the training and certification topic. Veröffentlicht in Climate Change | 05/2017.

Supply and demand in the ETS 2

The study looks at the functioning of the new emission trading system for road transport, buildings, and small installations (ETS 2) in the EU. It explains the rules governing the supply of allowances including the functioning of the market stability reserve (MSR) and the price containment mechanisms. Furthermore, it assesses the balance of supply and demand as well as auctioning revenues under different assumptions for the development of CO2 emissions and CO2 price. Finally, the interaction between the ETS 2 and national targets under the Effort Sharing Regulation (ESR) and the relationship with the German national ETS is assessed and an outlook for the period until 2040 is provided.

Main topic: Salt water in the Asse mine

Water has been seeping into the Asse II mine for decades, resulting in a risk of what is known as “drowning”. Miners use this term to describe a situation in which so much water enters a mine that it is no longer safe to work in it and the mine must be abandoned. Around 12 cubic metres of solution per day are currently seeping into the mine through cracks in the surrounding rock and salt. This volume is equivalent to about 50 bathtubs. Even the experts from the BGE cannot predict how the rate of influx will vary over time, and it could change at any time in such a way that safe operation of the mine was no longer possible. In this case, the retrieval of radioactive waste would have to be abandoned. On this page Causes and background Not all water is the same How is the salt water monitored? How is the salt water disposed of? Will the disposal options remain constant? Is there no better way to seal the mine? Questions and answers Over decades of intensive salt mining, miners created numerous cavities in a very confined space, especially on the southern edge of the salt structure. These cavities are permanently exposed to rock pressure and are being slowly but steadily compressed. The movement of the rock creates cracks that allow water to penetrate into the mine. A blessing in disguise: the penetrating water contains large quantities of salt. Experts describe this as a saturated rock salt solution, meaning that the solution cannot dissolve any new rock salt and thereby enlarge the flow pathways. Rock salt is the term used by miners to refer to sodium chloride, also known as common salt. There are also other types of salt, such as various potassium salts. Incidentally, the amount of water in the mine is independent of the amount of rainfall above ground, because the water first travels through the rock for very long periods of time before penetrating into the mine. In other words, we don’t collect more water underground in times of higher rainfall. Diagrams : Intensive salt mining has left its mark on the Asse II mine. The resulting cavities were later largely backfilled, thereby stabilising the facility. The diagrams show all the cavities that ever existed in the Asse II mine – which were never open at the same time – as well as the mine in 2015, when numerous cavities had already been filled in . There are around 570 spots in the Asse II mine that are slightly damp or dripping. These spots often dry up on their own. In other places, the BGE collects the solution on a continuous basis. The most important collection point is the so-called main collection point at a depth of 658 metres (see diagram). This point is located around 100 metres above the emplacement chambers containing radioactive waste at the 750-metre level. At the main collection point, the BGE experts are currently collecting around 95% of the salt solution leaking into the Asse II mine (type A solution). This had no contact with the radioactive waste. An additional 1 cubic metre of salt water per day is collected below the main collection point (type B solution). This solution also had no contact with the radioactive waste. Further down in the mine, salt water that has come into contact with the radioactive waste and is contaminated is also collected. This comes to a small amount, averaging around 15 litres per day (type C solution). No matter where the BGE collects the solution, it undergoes intensive analysis. Among other things, checks are made of the following: volume of influent solution salt content temperature density. The solution is also analysed for radioactive substances, with tritium playing a particularly important role in this context. Tritium is a radioactive variant of hydrogen and originates from the stored waste. As this radioactive substance is gaseous and so small, it can escape from the emplacement chambers through extremely fine cracks and is absorbed on contact with the underground solution. However, measurements show that the solution from the main collection point (type A solution) contains only around a tenth of the quantity of tritium that would be permitted in drinking water. The collected salt water also contains traces of other radioactive substances that originate from the surrounding rock and have been absorbed by the water on its way through the rock mass. These substances are of natural origin and have nothing to do with the nuclear waste in the Asse II mine. The solution collected at the main collection point and cleared from a radiological perspective leaves the Asse II mine every three weeks. It is handed over to a certified specialist company from the chemical industry in order to recycle the salt. The solution is radiologically harmless. The solution arising at other collection points remains in the mine and is generally not radioactively contaminated. It is used in the mine to produce concrete, which the miners use to fill in residual cavities with a view to stabilising the mine. If the solution can only be collected after it has come into contact with the radioactive waste (type C solution), this usage is only possible to a limited extent. If the radioactive contamination is comparatively low, the BGE also uses this solution to make concrete in the deepest areas of the mine. This procedure has been authorised by the state mining office and ensures that the radioactive substances contained in the concrete no longer reach the surface. If the solution has a higher level of contamination, however, it is declared as radioactive waste and handed over to the state collection point of Lower Saxony. This rarely happens, however, and only applies to a few litres of solution. The BGE is constantly exploring other disposal options. It is important to do so because the mine can only be operated safely in the long term if the solution can be handed over on a regular basis. For example, the BGE currently only hands over type A solution, which is collected above the 700-metre level and is well below the limit value for tritium in the Drinking Water Ordinance. This voluntary commitment can only be met if the quantity of solution arising does not increase significantly below the 700-metre level. Since significantly larger quantities of water cannot be utilised underground, a disposal option would then have to be identified outside the Asse for type B solution in order to ensure continued safe operation of the mine. Since type B solution also has no contact with the waste, radiological clearance appears to be possible. Ultimately, the requirements of the Radiation Protection Act are decisive when it comes to the disposability of the solutions. Stabilisation work There is no way to seal the mine so that no more solution can enter. This is because the rock on the southern flank has been extensively loosened by rock displacement into the mining areas, and blocking one route would lead a new one to break open. It is important to stabilise the mine, and the BGE therefore backfills all cavities that are no longer required for the recovery of radioactive waste. This causes the mine to deform more slowly, as empirical values have already shown. It is impossible to predict how long the mine can be operated safely. An important prerequisite for the retrieval of waste is that the main collection point can be operated in a stable manner or alternative methods can be found for salt water management. Salt water has been flowing into the Asse mine since 1988. So far, a large part of this salt water has been collected at a depth of 658 metres at the so-called main collection point. This salt water is then tested for possible radiological contamination and pumped above ground. The situation has changed since the start of the year, and a greater volume of salt water is now being collected at several points below 658 metres than at the main collection point. Most of the radioactive waste lies at a depth of 750 metres. It is located in the former mining chambers of the old salt mine, which dates back more than 100 years. A measuring programme is being deployed there to check whether salt water comes into contact with the waste and therefore becomes contaminated. The measurements at the 750-metre level currently give no indication of an increase in contaminated solutions. There is no evidence that contaminated salt water reaches the surface, nor is this to be expected in the immediate future. Based on current knowledge, it would take several hundred years for radioactive substances to reach the surface. It is impossible to make a detailed calculation of the potential level of radiation exposure in the future, as this depends on the exact course of release. Possible scenarios range from exposure below the permissible limits to a slight exceeding of the limits. A large-scale evacuation is not to be expected. The BGE is continuing to pursue the retrieval of radioactive waste, and planning is ongoing. The BGE will only be able to say how current events affect retrieval planning once it has more information on how current events unfold and the plans have been reviewed accordingly. The BGE has been implementing precautionary measures to stabilise the mine for years. These precautionary measures are part of emergency planning and constitute a prerequisite for the retrieval of radioactive waste. Cross-flooding the mine is part of the emergency measures set out in the emergency planning. These measures will be implemented if the influx of solution increases to such an extent that it is no longer technically controllable. This is not currently the case. At present, miners are gradually working their way into the main collection point at the 658-metre level within the secured area in order to locate potential damaged areas of containment liner that are accessible and to carry out appropriate repairs. In April 2024, the BGE made an application for complete renovation of the main collection point at the 658-metre level. This project will be pursued further. The application has been submitted to the State Office for Mining, Energy and Geology (LBEG), which is the competent authority in this instance. As part of the application, the BGE requested that the LBEG allow necessary exploratory work to begin in advance of renovation based on a partial licence.

Sub-areas Interim Report pursuant to Section 13 StandAG (PDF)

Sub-areas Interim Report pursuant to Section 13 StandAG As per 28/09/2020 Ref.: SG01101/16-1/2-2021#1 – Object ID: 850052 – Revision: 00 Sub-areas Interim Report pursuant to Section 13 StandAG Table of Contents Table of Contents2 List of figures6 List of tables11 List of annexes18 List of abbreviations19 Glossary20 1Summary21 2Introduction28 2.1 2.2 2.3Occasion Purpose and objective Delimitation28 28 29 3The site selection procedure31 3.1 3.1.1 3.1.2 3.1.3 3.1.4 3.2 3.3Principles of the iterative site selection procedure Participative procedure and transparency Science based procedure Positive error culture and lessons learned Principle of reversibility Geo data and information Section 36 StandAG: How the BGE will deal with the Gorleben site33 34 34 35 36 36 37 4Identification of sub-areas pursuant to Section 13 StandAG37 4.1 4.1.1 4.1.2 4.1.3 4.1.4 4.1.5 4.2 4.2.1 4.2.1.1 4.2.2 4.2.3 4.2.3.1 4.2.3.2 4.2.4 4.2.4.1 4.2.4.2Definitions of terms and explanations Effective containment zone (ECZ) Claystone host rock Rock Salt host rock Crystalline host rock Maximum search depth Exclusion criteria according to Section 22 StandAG Principle of applying the exclusion criteria Development of the application methods Exclusion criterion “large-scale vertical movements” Exclusion criterion “active fault zones” Exclusion criterion “active fault zones” – tectonic fault zones Exclusion criterion “active fault zones” – atectonic fault zones Exclusion criterion “influences from current or past mining activities” Influences from current or past mining activities – boreholes Influences from current or past mining activities – mines38 38 39 40 41 42 43 43 43 44 46 47 53 57 57 61 Ref.: SG01101/16-1/2-2021#1 – Object ID: 850052 – Revision: 00 2 Sub-areas Interim Report pursuant to Section 13 StandAG 4.2.5 4.2.6 4.2.7 4.2.8 4.3.4 4.3.5 4.3.5.1 4.3.5.2 4.3.6 4.3.7 4.4 4.4.1 4.4.2 4.4.3 4.4.3.1 4.4.3.2 4.4.3.3 4.4.3.4 4.4.3.5 4.4.3.6 4.4.3.7 4.4.3.8 4.4.3.9 4.4.3.10 4.4.3.11 4.4.4 4.4.5Exclusion criterion “seismic activity” Exclusion criterion “volcanic activity” Exclusion criterion “groundwater age” Identification of excluded areas within the framework of Section 13 StandAG Minimum requirements according to Section 23 StandAG Data basis Application method for the minimum requirements Concept for application of the minimum requirements on the basis of the available data Application of the minimum requirements – claystone host rock Application of the minimum requirements – rock salt host rock Rock salt in a steep deposit Rock salt in a stratiform deposit Application of the minimum requirements – crystalline host rock Identified areas within the framework of Section 13 StandAG Geoscientific weighing criteria pursuant to Section 24 StandAG Data basis Application method Evaluation of the indicators and criteria Annex 1 (to Section 24 para. 3) StandAG Annex 2 (to Section 24 para. 3) StandAG Annex 3 (to Section 24 para. 3) StandAG Annex 4 (to Section 24 para. 3) StandAG Annex 5 (to Section 24 para. 4) StandAG Annex 6 (to Section 24 para. 4) StandAG Annex 7 (to Section 24 para. 5) StandAG Annex 8 (to Section 24 para. 5) StandAG Annex 9 (to Section 24 para. 5) StandAG Annex 10 (to Section 24 para. 5) StandAG Annex 11 (to Section 24 para. 5) StandAG Summarised evaluation Results of the geoscientific weighing criteria88 92 93 93 95 97 100 106 107 108 111 114 114 115 117 117 117 118 118 118 118 118 120 120 5Identified sub-areas pursuant to Section 13 StandAG122 5.1 5.1.1 5.1.2 5.1.3 5.1.4 5.1.5 5.1.6 5.1.7Sub-areas in claystone host rock Sub-area 001_00TG_032_01IG_T_f_jmOPT Sub-area 002_00TG_044_00IG_T_f_tUMa Sub-area 003_00TG_046_00IG_T_f_tUMj Sub-area 004_00TG_053_00IG_T_f_tpg Sub-area 005_00TG_055_00IG_T_f_jm Sub-area 006_00TG_188_00IG_T_f_ju Sub-area 007_00TG_202_02IG_T_f_kru128 128 131 134 137 140 143 146 4.3 4.3.1 4.3.2 4.3.3 Ref.: SG01101/16-1/2-2021#1 – Object ID: 850052 – Revision: 00 68 72 76 79 81 81 84 3

Press Release No. 9/21 – The BGE develops practical methods for the further repository search

In the coming years, 90 sub-areas are to become a small number of siting regions. These siting regions are to be explored above ground in the search for a final repository site for high-level radioactive waste in Germany. In order to be able to propose siting regions, the BGE is developing methods for identifying those siting regions that are favourable for final disposal. First of all, it is a matter of implementing the requirements and framework conditions for the representative preliminary safety analyses (rvSU) for all 90 sub-areas specified by the legislator. The methods for this are being developed using data from several sub-areas in different host rocks. As in the case of the sub-areas interim report, the experts of the BGE will develop methods for applying their containment and assessment tools with a practical orientation from the very beginning and will, of course, work with real data. These sub-areas, or even individual areas within sub-areas, are referred to as method development areasby the BGE. Method development areas A method development area is a sub-area that the BGE experts are looking at in order to be able to answer specific questions on the assessment of the safety of a repository system. It entails practical questions such as: How many boreholes have been drilled in this sub-area? And what can be deduced from the data obtained for the comprehensive geological description of the area with a view to the safe containment of the nuclear waste? Steffen Kanitz, Managing Director of the BGE for the Site Selection section, emphasises: “One area for method development is not better or worse than other areas. At this stage of the process, they merely allow us to develop methods for further delineating the areas of all 90 sub-areas”. The BGE aims to use the data from the method development areas in order to present a preliminary concept for the application of the rvSU for public discussion in spring 2022. All 90 sub-areas remain in the process and will eventually be assessed with these new methods. Four very different areas for method development across Germany The BGE aims to develop its methods using data from the following sub-areas: Sub-area 001_00 (Opalinus Clay) in Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria, parts of the Sub-area 009_00 crystalline (Saxothuringian), which extends from Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria to Saxony, Sub-area 035_00 (Bahlburg salt dome) near Hamburg, and Sub-area 078_02 (shallow salt structure in the Thuringian Basin). The transferability of the method development to other sub-areas (also tertiary clay) is being considered. These sub-areas vary considerably and cover all the host rocks considered for final disposal: salt, clay and crystalline. For the large-scale sub-areas, the challenge is to identify the particularly favourable areas within the sub-areas. In addition to the evaluation of geological properties based on existing geodata, some of which are currently being additionally queried, preliminary safety and repository concepts must be developed; these play a role in the evaluation of the respective repository systems. In addition to natural processes such as future ice ages, the basic possibility of safe operation must also be presented here. Just because an area plays a role in method development does not mean that it is particularly suitable or unsuitable. As work progresses in the coming months and years, other areas for method development may be added. A method development area is far from being a siting region A method development area should not be confused with a siting region, which is determined by the Federal Parliament only at the end of Phase I of the site selection procedure. Drilling or seismic measurements or other exploration methods will be used only once Parliament has approved the proposal of the BGE for siting regions after a review by the Federal Office for the Safety of Nuclear Waste Management (BASE). The BGE will provide information on the status of the work.

Summary: Sub-areas Interim Report according to Section 13 StandAG (PDF)

Summary Sub-areas Interim Report according to Section 13 StandAG As per 28/09/2020 Ref.: SG01101/16-1/2-2020#30 – Object ID: 830270 – Revision: 000 Summary Sub-areas Interim Report according to Section 13 StandAG In 2013, the German Bundestag and Bundesrat have passed a law to restart the search for the site with the best possible safety for a repository for the high-level radioactive waste produced in Germany. The “Commission on the Storage of High-level Radioactive Waste”, consisting of representatives of science, the German Bundestag and Bundesrat as well as associations, worked until 2016 on a concept for the site selection procedure based on the white map of Germany. For this purpose, the Commission developed rules, criteria and formulated requirements on a repository for high-level radioactive waste. The legislator passed the “Act on the search and selection of a site for a repository for high- level radioactive waste” (Site Selection Act – StandAG) in May 2017, which was based on the findings of the Commission. The Site Selection Act describes the principles science-based, participative, transparent, self-questioning and learning. The search area will be narrowed down increasingly over the course of three phases: starting with the entire federal territory; then surface exploration regions and subsurface exploration of sites; and finally a proposal for a repository site offering the best possible safety to accommodate high-level radioactive waste. The Bundesgesellschaft für Endlagerung mbH (BGE) is responsible for the site selection procedure as the German Waste Management Organisation. In this Interim Report, the BGE is presenting first results outlining sub-areas in preparation for defining the site regions. For final disposal, the BGE considers the host rocks rock salt, clay rock and crystalline rock within the framework of the work in accordance with section 13 StandAG and section 1(3) StandAG. According to Section 13 StandAG, sub-areas describe the areas in Germany where favourable geological conditions can be expected for the safe final disposal of high-level radioactive waste in one of the three possible host rocks. They are identified by the application of the geoscientific requirements and criteria that are legally stipulated in Section 22 StandAG (exclusion criteria), Section 23 StandAG (minimum requirements) and Section 24 StandAG (geoscientific weighting criteria). With this Sub-areas Interim Report, the BGE makes a contribution to engender the necessary public interest in the issue of final disposal and the site selection procedure. The Sub-areas Interim Report provides the basis for the Conference on Sub-areas and encourages participation. Hence, publication of the Sub-areas Interim Report lays the foundation to start the formal public involvement process at a stage that is sufficiently early to enable influence on the work and the findings of the site selection procedure. In order to ensure transparency in the decision-making process, this Interim Report and the supporting documents present the findings and all facts and considerations that are relevant to selection. The site selection procedure was launched in September 2017, and the BGE has started to work on it. Enquiries were sent to the federal and state authorities to obtain the data sets required to apply the legally stipulated geoscientific requirements and criteria throughout Germany. This Interim Report and its supporting documents describe the Geschäftszeichen: SG01101/16-1/2-2020#30 – Objekt-ID: 830270 – Revision: 000 2 Summary Sub-areas Interim Report according to Section 13 StandAG methods and their development. The general public and experts were involved in the process of preparing the application methods. In addition, the BGE discussed its application methods in public during online consultations that were held between November 2019 and August 2020. Some of the information obtained during these discussions prompted an adjustment of the application methods. During the process of identifying the sub-areas, a first step involved excluding areas that are unsuitable as repository sites for high-level radioactive waste according to the legally defined exclusion criteria according to Section 22 StandAG. The exclusion criteria include large-scale vertical movements, active fault zones, influences from current or past mining activities, seismic activity, volcanic activity and young groundwater age. The rules set out in Section 22(1) StandAG state that an area is classified as unsuitable as soon as one of the defined exclusion criteria applies. The next step involved an assessment of the remaining areas to determine which ones meet the minimum requirements of Section 23 StandAG. First of all, rock formations were identified which contain clay rock, rock salt and crystalline host rock types relevant to repositories. The minimum requirements refer to the hydraulic conductivity of the rock, the thickness of the effective containment area, the minimum depth of the effective containment area (i.e. its distance to the earth’s surface), the assumed minimum area of the repository and the preservation of the barrier effect. “Identified areas” that satisfy none of the exclusion criteria according to Section 22 StandAG and all of the minimum requirements according to Section 23(2) StandAG were obtained as a result of these two steps. In the third step, these identified areas will be evaluated according to the geoscientific weighing criteria defined in Section 24 StandAG in regard to their favourable overall geological situation and hence their suitability as a repository site for high-level radioactive waste. The geoscientific weighing criteria described in Annexes 1 to 11 (to Section 24) StandAG are used as evaluation benchmarks. These eleven criteria refer to the •transport of radioactive substances by groundwater movements in the effective containment zone; •configuration of the rock bodies; •spatial characterisability; •long-term stability of the favourable conditions; •geomechanical properties; •tendency to form fluid pathways; •gas formation; •temperature compatibility; •retention capacity in the effective containment zone; •hydrochemical conditions; and •protection of the effective containment zone by the overburden. Geschäftszeichen: SG01101/16-1/2-2020#30 – Objekt-ID: 830270 – Revision: 000 3

Depth-dependent permeability in crystalline host rock formations (PDF, nicht barrierefrei)

Depth-dependent permeability in crystalline host rock formations M. E. Bauer, S. B. Knopf, S. Fanara, F. Rohlfs, Z. Timar-Geng, K. Müller, M. J. Perner and E. Klein Hydraulic conductivity and permeability in crystalline rocks Permeability data for crystalline rocks Two of the key minimum requirements for an effective containment zone, a precondition for repository type 1, in crystalline host rock are stated in Section 23 StandAG: − The hydraulic conductivity must be less than 10-10 m/s − and the surface of an effective containment zone must be at least 300 meters below the ground surface.  Hydraulic conductivity in crystalline rock is controlled both by transmissive fracture and fault zones and by matrix permeability of crystalline rock blocks (governed by the groundwater flow through effective pore space)  Yet fracture networks in fault zones determine most of the transmissivity and thus rock permeability in crystalline rock formations in the uppermost continental crust (Faulkner et al. 2010; Mitchell & Faulkner 2012) An effective containment zone in crystalline rocks?  About 60% of the permeability data values from Achtziger-Zupančič et al. (2017) show hydraulic conductivity less than 10-10 m/s  The data compilation shows that in a majority of the represented crystalline rock blocks the minimum requirement of hydraulic conductivity (§ 23 para. 5 StandAG) could be fulfilled Fig. 1: Histogram showing permeability in crystalline rock formations of the German Ore Mountains [log scale of x-axis]. Cumulative percentage of rock permeability shown as blue curve; data taken from Achtziger-Zupančič et al. (2017). Fig. 2: Comparison of the Ore Mountains (German Erzgebirge) permeability data set (Achtziger-Zupančič et al. 2017) in comparison with other depth regression curves (log median) of permeability values from literature (Ahlbom et al. 1983a; Ahlbom et al. 1983b; Ahlbom et al. 1983c; Ahlbom et al. 1983d; Ingebritsen & Manning 1999; Masset & Loew 2010; Saar & Manga 2004; Shmonov et al. 2003; Stober & Bucher 2007; Winkler & Reichl 2014); Data from Achtziger-Zupančič et al. 2017 plotted as regression through the log median, the 5% and 95% quantiles of the galleries and mine levels, or 100m depth intervals of ore fields/mines; Red colouring outlines the higher hydraulic conductivity in the upper 500 m in crystalline host rock formations (greater than 10-10 m/s); Figure modified after Achtziger-Zupančič et al. (2017). Fig. 3: Hydraulic data set from northern Switzerland (crystalline rock exploration by nagra); Hydraulic properties vs. Depth; a) log hydraulic conductivity of crystalline rock blocks, b) log transmissivity of water-conducting fractures; Figure modified after Nagra (1994) Optimum repository depth in crystalline host rocks at greater depths?  Although a large horizontal variation of permeability values (by orders-of-magnitude due to fracture networks around fault zones) can be observed for different depth levels, the mean vertical permeability values decrease with depth  The presented hydrogeological data sets (Fig. 2 and 3) show that the minimum requirement of hydraulic conductivity (less than 10-10 m/s) is, on median, only achieved at depths of at least 500 metres within crystalline host rock formations  With increasing depth, matrix permeability in crystalline rock blocks should become more important (Fig. 3)  Yet, even at greater depth than a few hundred metres, steep dipping conductive fractures in major regional fracture zones control groundwater flow (Faulkner et al. 2010; Mitchell & Faulkner 2012)  Based on the existing hydrogeological data, we discuss an optimum repository depth for repository type 1 systems within crystalline host rock formations (Fig. 4) Fig. 4: Generic geological model of hydraulic conductivity in crystalline host rocks in Germany. Red colouring outlines the higher hydraulic conductivity in the upper 500 m in crystalline host rock formations (greater than 10-10 m/s). References Achtziger-Zupančič, P., Loew, S. & Hiller, A. (2017): Factors controlling the permeability distribution in fault vein zones surrounding granitic intrusions (Ore Mountains/Germany). Journal of Geophysical Research: Solid Earth, Bd. 122, S. 1876-1899. ISSN 2169-9313. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1002/2016JB013619 Ahlbom, K., Albino, B., Carlsson, L., Danielsson, J., Nilsson, G., Olsson, O., Sehlstedt, S., Stejskal, V. & Stenberg, L. (1983a): Evaluation of the geological, geophysical and hydrogeological conditions at Kamlunge. SKBF-KBS-TR-83-54. Swedish Nuclear Fuel Supply Co. Stockholm, Sweden Ahlbom, K., Albino, B., Carlsson, L., Nilsson, G., Olsson, O., Stenberg, L. & Timje, H. (1983b): Evaluation of the geological, geophysical and hydrogeological conditions at Gideå. SKBF-KBS-TR-83-53. Swedish Nuclear Fuel Supply Co. Stockholm, Sweden Ahlbom, K., Carlsson, L., Carlsten, L.-E., Duran, O., Larsson, N.-Å. & Olsson, O. (1983c): Evaluation of the geological, geophysical and hydrogeological conditions at Fjällveden. SKBF-KBS-TR-83-52. Swedish Nuclear Fuel Supply Co. Stockholm, Sweden Ahlbom, K., Carlsson, L., Gentzschein, B., Jämtlid, A., Olsson, O. & Tirén, S. (1983d): Evaluation of the geological, geophysical and hydrogeological conditions at Svartboberget. SKBF-KBS-TR-83-55. Swedish Nuclear Fuel Supply Co. Stockholm, Sweden Faulkner, D. R., Jackson, C. A. L., Lunn, R. J., Schlische, R. W., Shipton, Z. K., Wibberley, C. A. J. & Withjack, M. O. (2010): A review of recent developments concerning the structure, mechanics and fluid flow properties of fault zones. Journal of Structural Geology, Bd. 32, S. 1557-1575. ISSN 0191-8141. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsg.2010.06.009 Ingebritsen, S. E. & Manning, C. E. (1999): Geological implications of a permeability-depth curve for the continental crust. Geology, Bd. 27, S. 1107-1110. ISSN 19432682. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1130/0091-7613(1999)027 Masset, O. & Loew, S. (2010): Hydraulic conductivity distribution in crystalline rocks, derived from inflows to tunnels and galleries in the Central Alps, Switzerland. Hydrogeology Journal, Bd. 18, S. 863-891. ISSN 14350157. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10040-009-0569-1 Mitchell, T. M. & Faulkner, D. R. (2012): Towards quantifying the matrix permeability of fault damage zones in low porosity rocks. Earth and Planetary Science Letters, Bd. 339-340, S. 24-31. ISSN 0012-821X. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.epsl.2012.05.014 Nagra (1994): Hydrodynamic Synthesis and Modeling of Groundwater Flow in Crystalline Rocks of Northern Switzerland. Technical Report 92-04. Nagra. Wettingen Saar, M. O. & Manga, M. (2004): Depth dependence of permeability in the Oregon Cascades inferred from hydrogeologic, thermal, seismic, and magmatic modeling constraints. Journal of Geophysical Research: Solid Earth, Bd. 109, S. 1-19. ISSN 01480227. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1029/2003JB002855 Shmonov, V. M., Vitiovtova, V. M., Zharikov, A. V. & Grafchikov, A. A. (2003): Permeability of the continental crust: Implications of experimental data. Journal of Geochemical Exploration, Bd. 78-79, S. 697-699. ISSN 03756742. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0375-6742(03)00129-8 StandAG: Repository Site Selection Act, published May 5, 2017; last amended by Article 1 of the Act of December 7, 2020 (BGBl. I p. 2760). Stober, I. & Bucher, K. (2007): Hydraulic properties of the crystalline basement. Hydrogeology Journal, Bd. 15, S. 213-224. ISSN 1435-0157. DOI: 10.1007/s10040-006-0094-4 Winkler, G. & Reichl, P. (2014): Scale dependent hydraulic investigations of faulted crystalline rocks—Examples from the Eastern Alps, Austria. In: J. M. Sharp (Hrsg.): Fractured Rock Hydrogeology. Bd. 20, S. 181-196, London, UK: CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group. ISBN 9781138001596 www.bge.de Tage der Standortauswahl 2022 / Aachen GZ: SG01201/12/2-2022#24 | Objekt-ID: 931183 | Stand 03.06.2022

Approaching Complex Systems and Uncertain Futures: Development of a Database for the Representative Preliminary Safety Assessments of the Disposal System (PDF, nicht barrierefrei)

Approaching Complex Systems and Uncertain Futures: Development of a Database for the Representative Preliminary Safety Assessments of the Disposal System T. Wengorsch, E.-M. Hoyer, P. Müller, F. Schöne, M. Wengler, A. Bartetzko and W. Rühaak 1. Introduction German Site Selection Procedure The representative preliminary safety analyses aim to assess the extent to which the safe containment of the radioactive waste can be expected (Section 27 StandAG). The analysis of the disposal system will be based on elaborating its potential future evolutions (Fig. 1, § 3 EndlSiAnfV). This requires large amounts of data concerning different components of the disposal system to be managed, for example the compilation of physical, geoscientific and technical parameters. The compilation of these data, linked to features, events and processes (FEP) will generate site specific potential evolutions (scenarios) of the disposal system. A database solution aims to not only provide the data, but also the framework needed for the analyses. Human actions Initial state Expected evolution Physically possible Deviating evolution § 3 EndlSiAnfV Hypothetical evolution Fig. 1: The initial state marks the beginning of the post-closure phase and starting “area” of all expected, deviating and hypothetical future evolutions of the disposal system. The cone represents the future space (after Christophilopoulos, 2021), single evolutions of the system are indicated by arrows. Evolutions based on human actions, less predictable than technological and natural evolutions, are represented by the sketch of a person. In the representative preliminary safety analyses only expected and deviating evolutions based on geogenic events and processes have to be considered (§ 7 para. 6 no. 1 EndlSiUntV), hypothetical evolutions and human actions are therefore greyed out. (Source: BGE) Necessary knowledge about the disposal system:  Characterizing features: components and their properties  Events and processes: processes acting in and on the disposal system  Large area and number of subareas will generate a large number of investigation areas and hence analyses that have to be performed.  Scenario development in the past has been performed for generic disposal sites or to compare a small number of potential sites (Beuth et al. 2012, Mayer et al. 2019), but not yet for multiple different disposal concepts and a large number of potential sites at the same time.  Innovation is required to reduce workload while still ensuring fair representation for each investigation area. Generic scenarios 3. Workflow and Database Model  The database is intended to handle both parameter documentation, FEP- catalogue and scenario development, ideally generating well structured output of parameterised scenarios for the modelling team.  A prototype of the database is currently developed using MS Access, final implementation utilizing MS SQL Server.  Publication is intended as web-interface as well as a printed report for long-term archival storage. 2. Challenges Generic FEP Catalogue & Scenario Development The Federal Company for Radioactive Waste Disposal (BGE) is the German waste management organisation responsible for implementing the search for a site with the best possible safety for the disposal of high-level radioactive waste for at least 1 million years, following the amendments of the Repository Site Selection Act (StandAG) in 2017. The selection procedure is meant to be a participatory, transparent, learning and self-questioning process based on scientific expertise. It consists of three phases with an increasing level of detail. The first step of the first phase of the site selection procedure was completed in September 2020 and resulted in the identification of 90 subareas that give reason to expect favourable geological conditions for the safe disposal (BGE 2020). The potentially suitable subareas cover approximately 54% of Germany and are located in three different host rocks: rock salt (halite), claystone and crystalline rock. The second step of phase one is currently in progress (Section 14 StandAG) and includes the so-called representative preliminary safety analyses that aim to assess the extent to which the safe containment of the radioactive waste can be expected. Representative preliminary safety analyses are one of the foundations for deciding whether an area will be considered for surface-based exploration in the next phase of the site selection procedure. Within the preliminary safety analyses, the behaviour of the disposal system is analysed in its entirety, across all operational phases of the repository and under consideration of possible future evolutions of the disposal system with respect to the safe containment of the radioactive waste. Proposed workflow (Fig. 2):  Develop generic disposal concept and generic scenario development for each possible disposal system  Document parametrisation of disposal system for each investigation area  Screen generic concept and scenario development, then assign local information to generic concept for each investigation area Specific FEP Catalogue & Scenario Development Specific scenarios Feature 1 Parameter catalogue Subarea Feature 2 Process 1 Interaction Network Investigation area Adjusted Interaction Network Process 3 Representative Profile Barrier Generic disposal system concepts Generic manifestation Features Generic manifestation Sea level change Covers generic site Features Erosion Reaches reposi- tory mine Over- burden 100 m thick300 - 1400 m thick 300 - 1500 m deep Interactions Specific manifestation Sea level change Host Rock Processes Screening Processes Processes Generic disposal system concept in specific investigation area Process 2 Maximal Interactions Processes Feature 3 Does not reach site Features Specific manifestation Features Erosion Host Rock Over- burden Processes Replace with specific manifestation Predicted erosion 50 m Features Host RockOver- burden 100 m thick500 m thick Layers  Overburden (and adjoining rock)  Host Rock  Preliminary Repository Mine Building Blocks  Sand layer in overburden  Clay layer in overburden  Host Rock matrix  Waste form  … Parameters  Thermal Conductivity  Spec. Thermal Capacity  Porosity  … grouped by for each for each Values 500 m deep Fig. 2: Proposed workflow for the scenario development within the scope of the analyses of the disposal system for multiple disposal concepts and multiple investigation areas (Source: BGE) References Beuth, T., Bracke, G., Buhmann, D., Dresbach, C., Keller, S., Krone, J., Lommerzheim, A., Mönig, J., Mrugalla, S., Rübel, A. & Wolf, J. (2012): Szenarienentwicklung: Methodik und Anwendung. Vorläufige Sicherheitsanalyse für den Standort Gorleben. GRS - 284. Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe (BGR), DBE Technology GmbH, Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) gGmbH. Köln. ISBN 9783939355601 BGE (2020): Sub-areas Interim Report pursuant to Section 13 StandAG. Peine: Bundesgesellschaft für Endlagerung mbH. https://www.bge.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Standortsuche/Wesentliche_Unterlagen/Zwischenbericht_Teilgebiete/Zwischenbericht_Teilgebiete_-_Englische_Fassung_barrierefrei.pdf Christophilopoulos, E. (2021) Special Relativity Theory Expands the Futures Cone’s Conceptualisation of the Futures and The Pasts, Journal of Futures Studies, 26(1): 83–90 EndlSiAnfV: Endlagersicherheitsanforderungsverordnung vom 6. Oktober 2020 (BGBl. I S. 2094) EndlSiUntV: Endlagersicherheitsuntersuchungsverordnung vom 6. Oktober 2020 (BGBl. I S. 2094, 2103) Mayer, K.-M., Beuth, T. & Bracke, G. (2019): Szenarienentwicklung für verschiedene Wirtsgesteine und Konzepte. GRS - 525. Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) gGmbH. Köln, Garching b. München, Berlin, Braunschweig. ISBN 9783947685103 StandAG: Standortauswahlgesetz vom 5. Mai 2017 (BGBl. I S. 1074), das zuletzt durch Artikel 1 des Gesetzes vom 7. Dezember 2020 (BGBl. I S. 2760) geändert worden ist www.bge.de Tage der Standortauswahl 2022 / Aachen GZ: SG01201/12/2-2022#21 | Objekt-ID: 930051 | Stand 30.05.2022

Preliminary safety analysis in the high-level radioactive waste site selection procedure in Germany (PDF)

Preliminary safety analysis in the high- level radioactive waste site selection procedure in Germany Interdisciplinary research symposium on the safety of nuclear disposal practices 2021 Eva-Maria Hoyer, Phillip Kreye, Thomas Lohser, Wolfram Rühaak 10. – 12.11.2021, Berlin GZ: SG02301/11-2/4-2021#16 | Objekt-ID: 903235 Implementation of the German Site Selection Procedure Sub-areas Interim Report 28/09/2020 Decision on surface exploration (Section 15 StandAG) Phase I Phase II Step 1: Identification of sub- areas (Section 13 StandAG1) Step 2: Identification of regions for surface exploration (Section 14 StandAG) Surface exploration, analyses of socio- economic potential and proposal for subsurface exploration (Section 16 StandAG) Decision on subsurface exploration (Section 17 StandAG) Decision on repository site 2031 Phase III rvSU2 Subsurface exploration, Environmental Impact Assessment Report (Section 18 StandAG), Final site comparison and site recommendation (Section 19 StandAG) wvSU3 Application of exclusion criteria (Section 22 StandAG) Application of minimum requirements (Section 23 StandAG) Application of geoscientific weighing criteria (Section 24 StandAG) Preliminary safety analysis (Section 27 StandAG) Planning scientific weighing criteria (Section 25 StandAG) uvSU4 Source: BGE 1StandAG: Standortauswahlgesetz vom 5. Mai 2017 (BGBl. I S. 1074), das zuletzt durch Artikel 1 des Gesetzes vom 7. Dezember 2020 (BGBl. I S. 2760) geändert worden ist 2rvSU: representative preliminary safety analysis, Section 14 StandAG 3wvSU: further developed preliminary safety analysis, Section 16 StandAG 2 SafeND | Hoyer, Kreye, Lohser, Rühaak GZ: SG02301/11-2/4-2021#16 | Objekt-ID: 903235 10.11.2021 4uvSU: comprehensive preliminary safety analysis, Section 18 StandAG Preliminary Safety Analysis Siting regions Exploration programs Preliminary Safety Analysis (Section 27 para. 1 and 2 StandAG ) planWK1 Section 25 StandAG Comparison between areas (1) Subject […] is the assessment of the extent to which safe containment of the radioactive waste can be expected by exploiting the geological conditions […] Application for each UR2 (2) The preliminary safety analyses […] shall consider the repository system in its entirety and assess its safety […] geoWK3 rvSU4 Sub-areas 1planWK: planning scientific weighing criteria 2UR: investigation area Source: BGE 3 SafeND | Hoyer, Kreye, Lohser, Rühaak GZ: SG02301/11-2/4-2021#16 | Objekt-ID: 903235 10.11.2021 3geoWK: geoscientific weighing criteria 4rvSU: representative preliminary safety analysis

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